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Abstract
Evidence from studies in international relations, the politics of reform, collective action and price
competition suggests that economic agents in social dilemma situations cooperate more to avoid losses
than in the pursuit of gains. To test whether the prospect of losses can induce cooperation, we let
experimental subjects play the traveler’s dilemma in the gain and loss domain. Subjects cooperate
substantially more over losses. Furthermore, our results suggest that this treatment effect is best
explained by reference-dependent risk preferences and reference-dependent strategic sophistication. We
discuss the implications of our results and relate our findings to other experimental games played in
the loss domain.
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1. Introduction
In many contexts it is efficient for two or more agents to cooperate, yet the cooperative outcome
leaves each agent with an incentive to deviate at the expense of the others. How cooperation can be
sustained in such social dilemmas is the focus of several literatures across the social sciences. But one
empirical observation has thus far evaded a convincing unifying explanation: cooperation appears to be
more likely when agents face losses. For example, there is evidence that governments reach international
agreements more readily when losses are at stake, that reforms, which require the cooperation of several
stakeholders, are often spurred by crises, and that price competition between firms is on average less
severe during economic downturns (see section 2.1 for a more detailed discussion of our motivating
examples).
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It is difficult to establish the causal effect of losses on cooperative behavior in the field, where
confounds cannot be ruled out and where it is hard to know for certain whether a given outcome truly
places an agent in the loss domain. We therefore conduct a controlled laboratory experiment in which
we let subjects play a once-off, anonymous social dilemma and vary exogenously whether payoffs are
framed as gains or as losses. The experiment is also designed to investigate the mechanism by which
the prospect of losses impacts on cooperation.1
Our experimental game is the traveler’s dilemma (henceforth TD),2 in which two players simulta-
neously submit claims that may take any value between a lower bound and an upper bound (Basu,
1994). Both players then receive the lower of the two submitted claims and a reward of size R is paid
to the player making the lower claim, while a penalty of size R is deducted from the payoff of the player
making the higher claim. Each player in the TD has an incentive to minimally undercut the other and
in the unique Nash equilibrium, both players are thus maximally uncooperative and claim the lower
bound of the action space.
We implement two main treatments. In the gain treatment admissible claims lie between 3 and 8
euros. In the loss treatment subjects are given 11 euros in cash for their participation at the begin-
ning of the experiment and then stand to lose money, with admissible claims ranging from -8 to -3
euros. In both treatments the reward/penalty parameter R takes a value of 3 euros and subjects play
the game repeatedly, being anonymously matched with a new partner each time. The loss and gain
treatments differ only in how payoffs are framed3 and would be equivalent if subjects were expected
utility maximizers or if our framing did not have an impact on subjects’ reference points or strategic
sophistication.
We find that behavior is substantially more cooperative in the loss treatment. In particular, in early
periods of the experiment average claims in the loss treatment are up to 1.42 euros or 42 percent higher
than in the gain treatment. As learning sets in and strategic uncertainty is reduced, claims eventually
converge to Nash play in both treatments. This suggests that higher cooperation in the loss domain is
likely to arise mostly in surprising, complicated or uncertain settings, like those that characterize our
motivating examples.
We consider three plausible drivers of our treatment effect: gain-loss differences in risk preferences, in
social preferences and in strategic sophistication, i.e. subjects propensity to make mistakes in strategic
reasoning. If any such gain-loss difference in preferences or sophistication is driving our treatment
effect, then the variable in question should exhibit a treatment effect when elicited in an individual
decision-making task and it should correlate with behavior in the traveler’s dilemma.
We find that risk tolerance is higher and that strategic sophistication is lower in the loss domain.
The former effect is implied by prospect theory’s diminishing sensitivity (Kahneman and Tversky,
1We define “cooperation” as the act of working together toward social efficiency. According to our definition, this
behavior need not reflect deeper cooperative or prosocial motives.
2In section 3, we provide several arguments for why we believe the TD, rather than other commonly studied social
dilemmas, to be the ideal research vehicle for the question at hand.
3Suppose, for example, player 1 chooses the fully cooperative action, which is 8 in the gain treatment and -3 in the
loss treatment, and player 2 undercuts her by 0.1. Then, in both the loss and the gain treatment, player 1 leaves the
experiment with 4.9 euros and player 2 with 10.9 euros.
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1979). In the first test of gain-loss asymmetries in social preferences we are aware of, we find that
dictator game giving is not responsive to the gain-loss frame. Furthermore, a higher risk tolerance and
less strategic sophistication, but not dictator game giving, are associated with higher claims in the TD
for the average subject.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, it corroborates suggestive evidence from the field
that the prospect of losses causes economic agents to cooperate, while ruling out explanations that
do not rely on the gain-loss frame. Second, it uncovers that this treatment effect is driven by greater
risk tolerance and lower strategic sophistication when losses are at stake. In section 5 we discuss these
drivers in more detail and point to additional evidence for their relevance. In particular, our proposed
mechanism is consistent with a stylized model of game play in the traveler’s dilemma under strategic
uncertainty, estimates from a structural cognitive hierarchy model, further experimental treatments
and suggestive evidence from a questionnaire after the experiment.
In the following section we describe motivating examples from the field and relate our paper to the
broader experimental literature. In section 3, we describe our experimental design and in section 4 our
results. Section 5 discusses the drivers of our treatment effect before section 6 concludes and highlights
some implications of our results.
2. Related evidence from the field and lab
2.1. Motivating examples
A number of studies in international relations find that the threat of losses, more than the promise
of gains, induces national governments to cooperate on multilateral economic surveillance and military
strategy (Stein and Pauly, 1992; Mercer, 2005). For example, it has been argued that the threat of losses
motivated the international cooperation of setting up the Bretton Woods agreement (Pauly, 1992); lead
to the Structural Impediments Initiative of 1989-1990, which saw Japan and the United States agree
to costly domestic reforms in order to facilitate a better trading relationship (Mastanduno, 1992); and
was the foundation of Israel’s cooperation with the US during the Gulf war (Welch, 1992).
Within countries, reforms are often spurred by crises (Weyland, 2002; Vis, 2009). Where inefficient
policies are the non-cooperative outcome of a game between political stakeholders, crises can bring
about a switch to more cooperative policymaking (Velasco, 1998; Tommasi, 2004). Being put in the
loss domain by a crisis appears to equip policy makers, the electorate and other stakeholders with the
risk tolerance required to pursue risky reforms and cooperation (Weyland, 1996; Tommasi, 2004; Vis
and Van Kersbergen, 2007).
Collective action to revolt seems puzzling in light of individuals’ incentives to freeride or defect
(Coleman, 1994; Moore, 1995). According to Berejikian (1992) and Fanis (2004), it is the threat of
losses that helps individuals overcome the freeriding problem and engage in a revolt.
In the context of organized labor, the credible threat of a strike, which requires a workforce to
cooperate, in response to wage cuts may help explain the downward stickiness of wages. Kahn (1997)
documents workers’ and firms’ resistance to nominal pay cuts and interprets it as evidence that current
wage levels constitute an important reference point. Bewley (2002) provides additional evidence and
various different explanations for the downward rigidity of wages.
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Price competition between firms is less fierce during economic downturns (Rotemberg and Saloner,
1986). Rojas (2012) and Ruffle (2013) show this effect in experimental games. Rotemberg and Saloner
(1986) explain it as the outcome of a repeated game, in which low demand decreases the temptation to
cheat. But since Bertrand competition is a social dilemma, our results suggest an alternative mechanism.
Bad demand conditions may lead to more cooperative or collusive outcomes because they put managers
in the loss domain.
2.2. Related experimental literature
Our social dilemma game is maximally simply. It does not have an equilibrium in dominant strate-
gies. And we take great care to credibly embed our subjects in the loss domain. Related experimental
papers differ from our paper along one or more of these dimensions.
Some studies in experimental economics compare subjects’ propensity to contribute to public goods
to their propensity to take from common resources (see Fosgaard et al. (2014) or Cox (2015) for a
list of papers in this literature).4 In these experiments, strategically equivalent public good games are
presented to subjects under either a giving frame (public good) or a taking frame (common resource).
The latter may conceivably also evoke a loss frame if subjects integrate the common resource into their
wealth.5 Evidence is mixed, with several studies finding higher contributions under the giving frame
and several other studies, including a large sample experiment by Fosgaard et al. (2014), finding the
opposite.
Our paper differs along two crucial dimensions from these experiments and we do not take a strong
stand on their findings. First, in line with our motivating examples and contrary to these experiments,
we attempt to truly put the subjects in our loss treatment in the loss domain, by paying out physical
currency before the experiment that has to be returned to the experimenter in case of losses. Second,
the linear public good games typically featured in the above experiments have a dominant strategy.
To capture the inherent riskiness of our motivating examples, our game does not. If agents are self-
interested, a dominant strategy implies that risk preferences should not impact on behavior.
Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. (2011) run an experiment that features a public good game without a domi-
nant strategy. In a control condition, a subject gains a prize g if at least k subjects (possibly including
herself) contribute c from their endowment. In the treatment, a subject can avoid a loss of g if at
least k subjects contribute and she gains c if she does not contribute. Endowments are identical across
treatments. Our experiment differs in two crucial ways. First, our loss treatment is deeply embedded
in the loss domain and we therefore can not interpret our results through the lens of loss aversion.
Second, unlike in our experiment, the two treatments in Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. (2011) would not be
identical if subjects were expected utility maximizers. Nonetheless, if we interpret their treatment as
inducing a loss frame, their finding that contributions are higher in the treatment than in the control
group when k is equal to the group size is consistent with our results.6
4In the field, Ostrom (1990) argues that groups frequently overcome individual incentives to exploit open access
common pool resources such as forests and fisheries, especially when appropriators are very dependent on the resource
and its risk of depletion is high (Ostrom, 2000).
5See Cox (2015) for a discussion of how take/give and gain/loss frames may be confounded in some of these studies.
6When the whole group needs to contribute for the public good to be created, contributing is risky in that it yields
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Some experiments in psychology compare prisoner’s dilemma play in the gain and loss domain, but
no clear treatment effect emerges (see De Dreu and McCusker (1997) and De Heus et al. (2010) for
reviews of the evidence). Similar to the linear public good game, the prisoner’s dilemma has a dominant
strategy and risk preferences are irrelevant if a player is self-interested. Interestingly, however, De Dreu
and McCusker (1997) find that individuals they characterize as collaborators do in fact cooperate
more in the loss domain. This is in line with our findings. An individual with sufficiently strong social
preferences like inequity aversion, for example, obtains the highest utility from both parties cooperating,
while cooperating and being defected upon constitutes the worst-case scenario. When there is strategic
uncertainty, defecting is therefore not a dominant strategy for collaborators and risk preferences matter
in determining their favored action much like they do in the TD. This is also consistent with evidence
in Mengel (2014), who finds that the downside risk of cooperating is the most important driver of
cooperation in prisoner’s dilemmas with random matching.
In a two-player game of chicken, player 1’s preference ordering over outcomes is given by (defect,
cooperate) ≻ (cooperate, cooperate) ≻ (cooperate, defect) ≻ (defect, defect). De Heus et al. (2010)
find that individuals cooperate less when they play the game of chicken in the loss domain. They
argue that the payoff structure of the game implies that defecting is the high-potential-reward and
high-variance action and that subjects defect more frequently in the loss domain because of diminishing
sensitivity. Therefore, their findings lend support to our risk-preference based explanation and highlight
the importance of a game’s exact payoff structure in shaping gain-loss differences in strategic behavior.
Their version of the chicken game is not a social dilemma, but even if it were we find that the TD’s
assumption that (defect, defect) ≻ (cooperate, defect) better fits our motivating examples. Moreover,
their study ignores strategic sophistication and does not elicit preferences in individual decision making
tasks.
The TD can also be understood as capturing a setting of imperfect price competition between
two firms with differentiated products or capacity constraints.7 The effect of the loss treatment then
captures the anticompetitive effects of sunk costs or bad demand conditions. Offerman and Potters
(2006) find that auctioning off entry fees or imposing fixed sunk costs in a Bertrand oligopoly increases
collusion among experimental entrants, Kachelmeier (1996) finds that sunk costs have no effect in
a double auction and Buchheit and Feltovich (2011) find that experimental market prices are first
increasing and then decreasing in sunk costs. Our experiment differs in that it is simpler and explicitly
designed to induce losses and uncover the mechanism behind our treatment effect.
Previous experiments featuring the TD show that for low values of R relative to the upper bound,
claims are clustered around the highest possible claim (Capra et al., 1999; Goeree and Holt, 2001; Becker
et al., 2005; Rubinstein, 2007), a result we replicate in online appendix E. As the reward/penalty
parameter grows larger, however, claims converge to the Nash equilibrium play (Capra et al., 1999;
Goeree and Holt, 2001). This comparative static in R is well explained by models of noisy decision
g − c if everybody else is contributing and −c if at least one person fails to contribute. Not contributing, on the other
hand, is safe in that it yields zero payoffs with certainty.
7See Capra et al. (2002) for an experiment in which firms engage in Bertrand competition and the firm setting the
higher price has a non-vanishing market share. In this case, the size of the residual market is the counterpart of the
reward/penalty parameter in the TD.
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making (Capra et al., 1999) and models of strategic uncertainty (Baghestanian, 2014), suggesting that,
as we assume, uncertainty plays a key role in driving behavior in the TD.
We explain our treatment effect by asserting that subjects are less risk averse and less sophisticated
in the loss domain. Diminishing sensitivity (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), has been documented in
the decision making of experimental subjects and the general population (Booij et al., 2010; Tymula
et al., 2012). In a review of studies that estimate the curvature of individuals’ utility functions in
the gain and loss domain 9 out of 11 studies find risk loving preferences in the loss domain and risk
aversion in the gain domain (Booij et al., 2010). Camerer (2003) provides some examples from the
field. However, our explanation is based on a weaker condition than diminishing sensitivity: we merely
require that individuals are less risk averse in the loss domain.
In line with our result on subjects’ sophistication, Tymula et al. (2012) find that in a sample of over
8000 individual choices, stochastic dominance violations in choices between simple lotteries and certain
payoffs are more likely in the loss domain. In line with our result that dictator game giving is not
correlated with actions in the TD, Brañas-Garza et al. (2011) document that pro-social considerations
are absent from a subjects’ ex-post explanation of the action they chose in a TD experiment.
3. Design
We let subjects in a computerized experiment play the traveler’s dilemma, a two-player game in







xi +R if xi < xj
xj −R if xi > xj
xi if xi = xj
.
The TD captures the basic trade-off between what is privately and socially optimal that characterizes
our motivating examples. Yet its simple payoff structure makes it easy to explain to experimental
subjects. Compared to its close relative, the prisoner’s dilemma, it delivers a rich distribution of
actions.8 The TD is preferable to linear public good games because these lack the uncertainty about
the marginal private returns to cooperation that characterizes the real-world social dilemmas we seek
to capture. At the same time, it is analytically simpler than step-level public good games that contain
said uncertainty, but often feature multiple equilibria.
Subjects were randomly assigned to sessions belonging to either a gain or a loss treatment. In the
gain treatment, subjects received no participation fee and admissible claims lay between 3 and 8 euros.
In the loss treatment, they received a participation fee of 11 euros before the experiment and admissible
claims lay between -8 and -3 euros. Subjects then had to reimburse the experimenter for any losses
they incurred. R was set equal to 3 euros in both treatments.
In a first set of sessions, which we call experiment 1, subjects played the TD five times9 and the
action set was finely grained: any multiple of 0.1 euros between the lower and upper bound of the
8This facilitates estimating the structural model we use to get at the mechanism that drives our treatment effect in
appendix B.
9They then played five more surprise periods that serve as a consistency check that we discuss in online appendix E.
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claims range was admissible. In a second set of sessions, which we call experiment 2, we let subjects
play the TD ten times and elicited risk preferences, social preferences and propensity to make mistakes
in strategic reasoning. In experiment 2, we restricted claims to be multiples of 0.5.10 Experiment 1
was designed to investigate the treatment effect in a clean fashion, without contamination or excessive
cognitive load from other tasks. Experiment 2 serves to investigate the drivers of the treatment effect
we observe and provides a view of how play evolves in later periods.
In both experiments, we paired each subject with a different person in each period to avoid dynamic
strategic considerations and we used a randomly selected period to determine final earnings to avoid
wealth effects. In experiment 2, periods that featured preference elicitation tasks were also eligible to
be selected for payment. The TD was introduced to subjects in its abstract form (see the instructions
in online appendix F).
The experiments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We conducted a total of twelve
experimental sessions at the Toulouse School of Economics experimental laboratory with student sub-
jects. Experiment 1 featured two sessions under the gain treatment (with 34 subjects), two under the
loss treatment (32 subjects), and two under the gain-loss treatment (34 subjects) that we describe in
appendix D. Sessions lasted less than 30 minutes and subjects earned on average 6.30 euros. Experiment
2 featured three sessions under the gain treatment (36 subjects) and three under the loss treatment (42
subjects). Sessions lasted 45 minutes and subjects earned on average 9.80 euros.
Table 1 depicts the design of experiment 2. The dashed arrows indicate that we switched the
timing of risk and social preference elicitation in half of the sessions, in order to detect potential order
effects. Payoffs from preference elicitation periods were only revealed at the end of part A. Part B
of the experiment came as a surprise and subjects were paid for it separately. Part C consisted of a
questionnaire on the motives behind subjects’ choices in the TD (see tables C.4 and C.5 in appendix
C).
Risk preferences. We elicited risk preferences by letting subjects choose between different lotteries, as
in Holt and Laury (2002) (see table C.1 in appendix C). Outcomes of lotteries in the loss treatment
were 11 euros less than those in the gain treatment and thereby fully embedded in the loss domain. The
HL switching point refers to the least favorable pair of lotteries for which a subject prefers the riskier
one. It is increasing in risk aversion. As a second non-strategic risk preferences elicitation task, we let
subjects play the TD of the corresponding treatment against the computer, which was programmed
to choose each claim with equal probability. The more risk averse a subject is, the lower her risk TD
claim should be.
Social preferences. To elicit social preferences, we paired each subject with a randomly selected anony-
mous partner.11 In a dictator game (see table C.2 in appendix C), dictators in the gain treatment had
10Experiment 2 therefore also allowed us to check whether our treatment effect replicates in a setting with a coarser
action set.
11In order to provide proper incentives without losing observations, each subject performed all social preference






• elicitation of risk preferences over gains
• 10 periods of the TD over gains
• elicitation of social preferences over gains
Part B:
• 3 AC fee





• 11 AC fee
• elicitation of risk preferences over losses
• 10 periods of the TD over losses
• elicitation of social preferences over losses
Part B:
• 9 AC fee
• quiz on the TD with a penalty for wrong
answers
Part C: questionnaire
Table 1 The sequencing of tasks in experiment 2
to choose how to split 8 euros with their partners, while dictators in the loss treatment had to choose
how to allocate a loss of 8 euros. The more prosocial a subject is, the higher her dictator giving should
be, i.e. the higher the dictator game payoff she allocates to her partner. As in the risk preference
elicitation, each subject also played the TD of her corresponding treatment against a computer that
randomly chose claims. This time, however, the computer’s payoff went to the subject’s partner. The
difference between choices in this task, which we denote by social TD claim, and the risk TD claim
provides another measure of prosociality.
Mistakes and strategic sophistication. In part B of experiment 2 we elicited subjects’ strategic sophisti-
cation by presenting them with a quiz featuring 8 questions of varying degrees of difficulty, ranging from
simple questions on the payoff structure to more advanced questions on optimal actions conditional on
an opponent’s behavior. Hypothetical payoffs and actions in the quiz were framed according to the
treatment the subject was in. Furthermore, subjects in the gain treatment earned 0.5 euros for a correct
answer, while subjects in the loss treatment lost 0.5 euros for a wrong answer. The quiz thus captured
the effect of incentivizing subjects through losses as well as the difficulty subjects may experience in
thinking in terms of losses. We also elicited subjects’ beliefs about their own and others’ performance
in the quiz, while providing incentives for accuracy as high as 2 euros. The initial fees for part B were
3 and 9 euros in the gain and loss treatment respectively, such that a given number of correct answers
yields identical earnings in the two treatments.
4. Results
4.1. The treatment effect on strategic behavior
Figure 1 depicts the gain and loss treatments’ distributions of claims, pooling all 5 periods of
experiment 1. For the sake of comparability, we present results in terms of net claims, which obtain
by adding the participation fee of the corresponding treatment to actual claims.12 The distribution
12That is, we translate claims in the loss treatment to claims into the action space of the gain treatment by adding
11 euros.
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Figure 1 Distribution of claims in experiment 1
in the gain treatment has most of its mass at the Nash equilibrium of 3. The distribution in the loss
treatment is more dispersed, with its modal claim in the center of the action set.
Figure 2a shows average net claims across periods in experiment 1. In each period, average claims
are higher in the loss treatment than in the gain treatment. In period 5, the average claim is 3.51
euros in the gain treatment and 4.96 euros in the loss treatment. Framing payoffs as losses therefore
increases cooperation by up to 41 percent. As depicted in figure 2b, average net claims in experiment
2 are also higher in the loss treatment, except for in the last period. Statistically, we can test for
differences in claims between treatments by comparing randomly drawn claims from either treatment
(using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test), by comparing means (using a two-sided t-test), or by comparing
the frequency of Nash play (using a two-sided Fischer’s exact test). In both experiments these three
comparisons tell us that claims in the loss treatment are significantly higher.13
Note that the treatment effect on strategic behavior is smaller in experiment 2 than in experiment 1.
This may be due to experiment 2’s coarser action set.14 Alternatively, it may be due to the preference
elicitation tasks that preceded the 10 periods of TD play and may have influenced a subject’s expectation
about her opponent’s behavior.
Experiment 2 allows us to observe TD play after 5 periods. In the final periods of the experiment we
observe convergence to Nash equilibrium play in both treatments. This may be the result of a learning
13Pooling data across periods of experiment 1, we find that a randomly selected claim from the loss treatment is
more likely than not to exceed a randomly selected claim from the gain treatment (p = 0.00, Wilcoxon rank-sum test),
that average claims are higher in the loss treatment (p = 0.00, t-test), and that the frequency of Nash play is higher
in the gain treatment (p = 0.00, Fischer’s exact test). Significance at the 1 or 5 percent level also obtains for these
three tests when looking at every period individually. Pooling data across periods for experiment 2, we again find that
a randomly selected claim from the loss treatment is more likely than not to exceed a randomly selected claim from
the gain treatment (p = 0.00, Wilcoxon rank-sum test), that average claims are higher in the loss treatment (p = 0.00,
t-test), and that the frequency of Nash play is higher in the gain treatment (p = 0.00, Fischer’s exact test). Per period
comparisons for experiment 2 show that differences between the treatments are mostly significant, albeit only marginally
in some and not at all in the last two periods. Consider the following per period tests (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, t-test,
Fischer’s exact test): period 1 (p = 0.041, p = 0.031, p = 0.010); period 2 (p = 0.012, p = 0.027, p = 0.005); period 3 (p =
0.079, p = 0.313, p = 0.069); period 4 (p = 0.000, p = 0.001, p = 0.001); period 5 (p = 0.027, p = 0.141, p = 0.020); period
6 (p = 0.002, p = 0.013, p = 0.012); period 7 (p = 0.028, p = 0.078, p = 0.064); period 8 (p = 0.000, p = 0.003, p = 0.000);
period 9 (p = 0.426, p = 0.459, p = 0.449); period 10 (p = 0.743, p = 0.874, p = 0.801).
14Consider the logic of the cognitive hierarchy model in appendix B, in which subjects with higher levels of sophistica-
tion undercut less sophisticated types. Of course, a subject who plans to minimally undercut her opponent in experiment






































Figure 2 Average claims per period
process by which subjects become better at predicting their opponent’s action or simply modify their
behavior on the basis of negative and positive reinforcement. Comparing earlier and later periods
demonstrates that our treatment effect and explanation are likely to be more pertinent in noisy and
uncertain settings. Arguably, most real world social dilemmas take place in precisely such environments.
4.2. Treatment effects on preferences and mistakes
The individual decision making tasks in experiment 2 can help us identify a plausible mechanism
underlying our treatment effect. For either risk preferences, social preferences or sophistication to
constitute a valid explanation of our treatment effect, the variable in question, when measured directly,
should respond to the loss treatment in the expected way.
Table 2 tells us whether preferences and the propensity to make mistakes exhibit treatment effects.
The first four rows of the table feature the switching points in a Holt and Laury (2002) lottery choice
list. Over the full sample, a t-test indicates that individuals are significantly more risk averse in the
gain domain. The pattern persists in row 2, where we only consider subjects for whom risk preferences
were elicited before the TD was played. Rows 3 and 4 exclude those subjects that did not switch
within the ten options of the HL lottery, thereby revealing themselves to irrationally preferring a sure
6 euros to a sure 10.5 euros. Subjects again exhibit more risk aversion in the gain domain, although
this difference falls just short of being significant at the 10 percent level when we only consider risk
preferences elicited in the first period. But since HL switching points do not exhibit order effects (see
table C.3 in appendix C), we can safely consider the whole sample.
Rows 5 and 6 of table 2 provide the first test of the impact of gain/loss frames on social preferences
we are aware of: subjects playing a dictator game do not give significantly more in the loss domain
compared to the gain domain.
Row 7 indicates that subjects do significantly better in a quiz about optimal play in the TD, when
they are paid with gains rather than penalized by losses and when payoffs in the quiz are framed as
10
Table 2 Elicited preferences and propensity to make mistakes
Gains Losses
Sample Mean N Mean N Difference
HL switching point full 6.83 36 5.95 42 0.88**
first round 6.72 18 5.62 21 1.10*
HL switching point (<11) full 6.31 32 5.56 39 0.75**
first round 6.19 16 5.35 20 0.84
Dictator giving full 3.14 36 3.21 42 -0.07
first round 3.17 18 3.62 21 -0.45
Quiz score full 5.89 36 4.21 42 1.67***
Risk TD claim full 4.94 36 5.57 42 -0.62**
first round 5.00 18 6.05 21 -1.05***
Social TD claim full 4.72 36 5.37 42 -0.65**
first round 4.81 18 6.00 21 -1.19***
Social TD − Risk TD full -0.22 36 -0.20 42 -0.02
first round -0.19 18 -0.05 21 -0.18
Note: The last column features t-tests on the difference in means between the
gain and the loss treatment: * (p < 0.1), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
gains rather than losses.
When we transform the TD into an individual decision making task in which subjects play against
a computer who picks a claim at random, subjects make considerably more risk averse choices in the
gain domain. This is reflected in the gain treatment’s lower Risk TD claim. Adding a social component
by giving the computer player’s payoffs to another subject does not significantly increase the difference
in behavior between the gain and loss domain. This is made precise in the last two rows of table 2.
To summarize, there is a treatment effect on risk preferences and the propensity to make mistakes,
as captured by the quiz, but not on social preferences. In section 5 we discuss how greater risk tolerance
and a greater propensity to make mistakes could plausibly map into higher claims.
4.3. Do elicited preferences and propensity to make mistakes correlate with behavior in the traveler’s
dilemma?
Further suggestive evidence for the mechanism can be gleaned from the correlations between indi-
vidually elicited subject characteristics and their strategic behavior. In particular, we expect any driver
of our treatment effect to actually correlate with strategic behavior.
Table 3 lists the results of eight OLS regressions of net claims in the TD on various independent
variables. Regressions 1 and 2 imply that the correlation between net claims in the TD and choices in
the simple non-strategic TD is higher than the correlation between strategic play and the non-strategic
TD that features a social motive.15 The absolute value of the coefficient in regression 1 may not be
informative, because, by design, the non-strategic TD and the strategic TD are very similar and hence,
15Because Risk TD claim and Social TD claim both exhibit order effects (see table C.3 in appendix C), regressions
1 and 2 are run over those subjects whose respective risk and social preferences were elicited before the strategic TD.
Since the intersection of these two samples is zero, a valid regression featuring both Risk TD claim and Social TD claim
cannot be run.
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Table 3 Determinants of net claims
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Risk TD claim 0.794***
(0.10)
Social TD claim 0.588***
(0.13)
HL switching point -0.183* -0.145 -0.073* -0.008
(0.10) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03)
Dictator giving -0.067 -0.109 0.008 0.012
(0.10) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03)
Quiz score -0.165** -0.165** -0.095*** -0.094***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02)
Period(s) of TD play 1 1 1 1 1 1 1-5 6-10
N 39 39 71 71 71 71 355 355
R-squared 0.473 0.321 0.048 0.007 0.070 0.119 0.042 0.052
Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in parenthesis; significance levels of coefficients: * (p < 0.1),
** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01); Observations with HL switching point = 11 are not included in the regressions.
drivers of behavior unrelated to risk preferences, like focal points in the action space or the description
of the game, could be at work in both. But the relative difference between the coefficients in regression 1
and regression 2 tells us that adding a social motive to the independent variable makes it less predictive
of strategic play. This speaks against an important social motive in the strategic behavior.
Regressions 3 through 5 indicate that a subject’s HL switching point and her performance in the
quiz, but not dictator giving, are correlated with claims in the first period of TD play. Since these
independent variables do not exhibit significant order effects, we can run a regression over the entire
sample of subjects and include measures of risk preferences, social preferences and sophistication. In
regression 6, the quiz score is the only significant independent variable. The HL switching points falls
just short of the 10 percent level.
Regression 7 pools observations from the first 5 periods of TD play: risk preferences and sophisti-
cation exhibit the expected correlation with strategic behavior. Regression 8 pools observations form
the last 5 periods, after some learning would have taken place. In these periods, it is mainly subjects
that did not fully understand the game (as captured by a low quiz score) that still deviate from Nash
play, while the median subject now plays the lowest action.
5. Discussion
Our experimental results suggest that greater risk tolerance and less strategic sophistication in the
loss domain are at the core of our treatment effect on strategic behavior. In this section, we provide
further context for this assertion and discuss several appendices that speak to our proposed mechanism.
To demonstrate that greater risk tolerance and less strategic sophistication are plausible drivers of
higher claims in the traveler’s dilemma, it is useful to study analytically how best to play the TD in the
presence of strategic uncertainty. In appendix A, we provide a simple theoretical example in which we
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model strategic uncertainty as stemming from an unsophisticated opponent who sometimes deviates
from Nash play.16 We show that our treatment effect on strategic behavior is consistent with subjects
exhibiting either more risk tolerance, more altruism or a higher propensity to make mistakes in the loss
domain.
To see why risk preferences matter, note that strategic uncertainty implies that moving away from
the least cooperative action of our experimental game may yield a higher expected payoff because
it allows a player to reap the benefits of a higher claim, while still undercutting her unsophisticated
opponent some of the time. But cooperation also exposes a player to the downside risk of being
undercut. More risk tolerance enables a subject to embrace this gamble that cooperation entails.
A lack of strategic sophistication, or a greater propensity to make mistakes, mechanically increases
the claims of a “mistaken” player, given that the counterfactual is Nash play at the least cooperative
action. Sophisticated payers will respond to this by also raising their claims, since higher claims are
now associated with a lower risk of being undercut than before.
In appendix B, we enrich our simple analytical example and consider the interaction between players
of several different levels of sophistication in a cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer et al., 2004). We
augment this model to allow for, respectively, curvature in players’ utility function and other-regarding
preferences.
The added complexity of a cognitive hierarchy model entails a loss of analytical tractability. Nonethe-
less, we can estimate the model’s parameters structurally from the experimental data. This allows us
to ascertain whether our suggested mechanism organizes the data well. We therefore use the cognitive
hierarchy not as an intuition pump but as an empirical test of the plausibility of our proposed mech-
anism.17 The structural estimates indicate that two parametrizations of the cognitive hierarchy model
best rationalize the experimental data: 1) more risk tolerance and 2) less sophistication in the loss
domain or 1̂) more altruism and 2̂) less sophistication in the loss domain. Both of these models provide
a better fit to the data than a model predicated solely on differences in strategic sophistication.
Together, the analytical example in appendix A and the cognitive hierarchy model in B demonstrate
that a combination of greater risk tolerance and lower strategic sophistication provide a plausible
mechanism for our treatment effect, but neither can rule out an explanation based on social preferences.
However, a social preference based explanation is forcefully rejected by the fact that social preferences,
elicited in individual decision-making tasks, do not exhibit a treatment effect (section 4.2) and do not
correlate with strategic behavior (section 4.3).
When we elicit the self-proclaimed motives behind subjects’ chosen claims in a questionnaire after
experiment 2 (see table C.4 and C.5 in appendix C), subjects’ answers are again more consistent with a
risk-preference based than a social-preference based explanation of the treatment effect. In particular,
16In the absence of uncertainty, neither risk preferences nor plausible social preferences can explain cooperation in the
TD. Noisy behavior in the TD is also empirically plausible: Oppenheimer et al. (2011) find that from period to period,
behavior of many individuals in social dilemmas appears to be almost random. Furthermore, models premised on noisy
decision making do well at explaining the effect of changing the reward/penalty parameter on subjects’ behavior in the
TD (Capra et al., 1999).
17For example, the structural parameter estimates could refute our proposed mechanism by reflecting greater risk
aversion or greater strategic sophistication in the loss domain.
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subjects in the loss domain consider “trying to gain a lot” to be a more important reason to choose a
high claim and “avoiding the risk of being undercut” to be a less important reason for choosing a low
claim than subjects in the gain domain.
We conducted two additional sets of treatments to test the scope of our risk-preference and sophis-
tication based explanation. In the gain-loss treatment, in online appendix D, both gains and losses
are possible. This treatment therefore lies between our two main conditions. We find that subjects’
behavior exhibits a form of loss avoidance (Cachon and Camerer, 1996): they predominantly choose
the action that minimizes their risk of loosing money. We estimate a cognitive hierarchy model to find
out what kind of preference function can rationalize this behavior. In line with our explanation for the
behavior in the two main conditions, the utility function we estimate in the gain-loss treatment has
the S-shape implied by diminishing sensitivity and has its steepest gradient, i.e. its implied reference
point, at the experimentally induced reference point.
In a further set of treatments, found in online appendix E, we set the reward/punishment parameter
to 0.5. Compared to the case of R = 3, cooperation increases in both the loss and the gain domain.
Moreover, when R = 0.5, subjects cooperate slightly more in the gain than in the loss domain. This
is consistent with our main results. Out-of-sample predictions of the cognitive hierarchy model that
is parametrized using the data from our main treatments with R = 3 match the empirical means
of this low-risk treatment. The intuition for this as follows. When the payoff loss associated with
being undercut is low, high cooperativeness is privately optimal for sophisticated players. Also, risk
preferences naturally matter less. In this setting, a higher propensity to make mistakes in the loss
domain then implies less cooperation.
Comparing the treatments with R = 0.5 with our main treatments suggests that our treatment
effect and proposed mechanism pertain mostly to high stakes situation. Moreover, looking at the later
periods of experiment 2 suggests that our treatment effect is likely to be more pronounced in noisy and
uncertain settings (see figure 2b). This is again consistent with a risk preference based explanation.
Risk preferences only matter when there is strategic uncertainty. In its absence, raising one’s claim is
definitely a bad idea. As a result, risk preferences do not govern behavior once sufficient learning has
taken place (see also column 8 in table 3).
6. Conclusion
We find that individuals are more likely to take a chance on one another when losses are at stake.
The prospect of losses induces cooperation in the traveler’s dilemma because subjects’ greater risk
tolerance and lower sophistication in the loss domain drive them to choose the risky action of deviating
from Nash play.18
An appreciation of not just the treatment effect on strategic behavior, but also its drivers, is helpful
in organizing existing experimental evidence. The key role that risk preferences play in driving our
results suggests that losses will lead to more cooperative behavior primarily in situations in which
18We find these effects in a once-off, anonymous interaction. Doing away with anonymity may open up further channels
through which losses impact on cooperation. For instance, the joint experience of losses my allow individuals to “bond”.
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selfish behavior is not a dominant strategy. We therefore conjecture that our proposed mechanism
could shed light on when and how a loss frame is likely to impact on behavior in non-linear public
good games, coordination games and Bertrand competition. Our proposed mechanism also elucidates
the scope of applicability of our experimental results. The treatment effect is more likely to play a
role when strategic uncertainty is high, as in the early periods of our experiment, and when the payoff
variance is large, as in our main treatment.
Our results yield tentative implications for scholars of management and political science. A manager
may want to keep subordinates from cooperating to provide low effort or organizing to demand higher
wages. As a result, she may try to evoke the gain frame whenever possible, for example, by attempting
to hide necessary cuts in real wages behind nominal wage increases. Abeler et al. (2011) and Fryer et al.
(2012) find that by embedding payment schemes in the loss domain, loss aversion can be leveraged as
a cheap way to increase effort in the lab and in the field respectively. Furthermore, De Quidt (2014)
finds that doing so has no negative impact on employee participation. In light of this evidence, it is
puzzling that the loss frame is not more widely used as an incentive device. Our results speak to this
puzzle. Where the organizational structure involves complicated games between employers and several
employees, employee cooperation fueled by risk tolerance may undermine the incentives to provide effort
generated by loss aversion.
Politicians who seek to foster cooperation among the different stakeholders to a reform or policy
initiative may find it useful to evoke a loss frame. The loss frame may not only increase the perceived
stakes through loss aversion, but also foster cooperation through the mechanism we uncover in this
paper. Indeed, leaders that wish to garner support for war, will often exaggeratedly point to the
“threat to our way of life” the enemy poses. Similarly, economic reforms are often advertised as the
only way to “remain competitive” or “avoid sliding deeper into recession”. However, our results also
imply that cooperation will primarily emerge in uncertain settings and that it will decline as players gain
experience. Therefore, a loss frame is probably most potently applied under exceptional circumstances
and cannot be exploited repeatedly to foster cooperation.
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A. A stylized model of strategic uncertainty
To gain an intuition for how bounded rationality, risk preferences and social preferences may shape
behavior in the TD, it is useful to transform the game into a non-strategic decision problem.19 Suppose
that player 1, a rational agent, is playing the TD with player 2, a non-strategic opponent, who plays the
Nash equilibrium strategy x2 = 3 with probability (1−p) ∈ [0, 1] and x2 = m+0.1 with complementary
probability, where m > 3.20 We may interpret p as the probability of a mistake and m as its size, so
that both p and m are measures of player 2’s lack of sophistication.
Assume first that player 1 is self-interested and that her utility is given by U(z1), where z1 represents
her material payoff and U ′(z1) > 0. Faced with player 2, player 1 then only has two sensible choices:
she may either play her Nash strategy x1 = 3, or she may try to capitalize on player 2’s mistake by
minimally undercutting, i.e. by playing x1 = m. Given the payoff structure of the TD, player 1 finds
it optimal to play x1 = m if and only if
21
(1− p)U(3−R) + pU(m+R) > (1− p)U(3) + pU(3 +R). (A.1)
When player 1 plays x1 = m instead of x1 = 3, she risks being undercut in situations in which player
2 does not make a mistake. This downside risk associated with moving away from the Nash outcome
is a key feature of the social dilemmas in the uncertain environments we outline in the introduction.22
Crucially, the spread of payoffs is higher on the left-hand side of equation (A.1) than on the right-hand
side: the minimum and maximum payoffs from playing x1 = m are respectively lower and higher than
the minimum and maximum payoffs from playing x1 = 3. Player 1 therefore has to decide between
two gambles with equal probabilities but different variances. A risk loving player 1 is more comfortable
with a higher variance in payoffs and thus more comfortable with playing x1 = m than a risk averse
individual.
We define a risk averse, a risk neutral and a risk loving individual as an individual whose utility
function is characterized by U ′′(z1) < 0, U
′′(z1) = 0 and U
′′(z1) > 0 respectively and we index them
by a, n and l. The following proposition then establishes more formally the above intuition, as well as
that cooperating is more attractive when mistakes on behalf of player 2 are large and frequent.
Proposition A.1. There exists a unique threshold p∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
- player 1 claims x1 = m if and only if p > p
∗ and x1 = 3 otherwise;
- p∗ is decreasing in m;
19The more elaborate model we adopt in the next section cannot be solved for analytically, which makes getting at
the intuition behind comparative statics harder.
20Without loss of generality we are implicitly assuming here that the TD is played with the fine action set.
21For ease of exposition, we assume that player 1 chooses the Nash strategy whenever indifferent.
22The downside risk would also be present if player 1 was choosing whether to defect or cooperate in a prisoners’
dilemma. However, contrary to the TD, in a prisoner’s dilemma, cooperating never yields higher utility for a self-
interested individual. For a sufficiently altruistic individual, on the other hand, (cooperate, cooperate) may be the
favored prisoners’ dilemma outcome.
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- p∗ is lower for a risk loving than for a risk neutral individual and higher for a risk averse than for a





Proof. The difference between the lhs and rhs of equation (A.1) is increasing in p, positive when p = 1
and negative when p = 0. There thus exists a unique threshold for which player 1 is indifferent between
playing 3 and m. This threshold is given by
p∗ =
U(3)− U(3−R)
U(3)− U(3−R) + U(m+R)− U(3 +R)
,
which is decreasing in m.
To show that p∗i < p
∗























with m+R > c > 3 +R and 3 > b > 3−R. From the definitions of risk preferences and the fact that
c > b it follows that U
′(c)
U ′(b)
> 1 for a risk loving individual, U
′(c)
U ′(b)









Let us now impose risk neutrality and allow for social preferences on behalf of player 1. In particular,
suppose that the utility of player 1 takes the form of U(z1; z2) = z1 + βz2, where z2 is the material
payoff of player 2 and β ∈ (0, 1) a measure of player 1’s altruism.23 The following proposition shows
that altruism, like risk lovingness, provides an incentive for player 1 to deviate from Nash play and
that this incentive is stronger the less sophisticated player 2 is:
Proposition A.2. There exists a unique threshold p∗β ∈ (0, 1) such that
- player 1 deviates from x1 = 3 if and only if p > p
∗
β;
- p∗β is decreasing in m and β.
Proof. When U(z1; z2) = z1 + βz2, the best deviation from x1 = 3 is either x1 = m or x1 = m + 0.1,
depending on whether
m+R + β(m−R) ≥ m+ 0.1 + β(m+ 0.1),
that is, on whether β ≤ R−0.1
R+0.1
≡ β̂. If β ≤ β̂, the best deviation is x1 = m and player 1 finds it optimal


















23We model prosocial considerations in the simplest possible way, but results generalize to more elaborate other-
regarding preferences. For instance, if player 1’s utility is as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), similar predictions obtain based
on her aversion to advantageous inequality.
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The difference between the lhs and rhs of equation (A.2) is increasing in p, positive at p = 1, negative





m+R− 3 + (m− 3)β
,
which is decreasing in β and m.



















The difference between the lhs and rhs of this inequality is again increasing in p, positive at p = 1,





10(m+ (m+R)β − 29(1 + β))
,
which is also decreasing in β and m. To conclude the proof, let p∗β be equal to p
∗
β≤β̂
for β ≤ β̂ and to
p∗
β>β̂





when β = β̂.
Propositions A.1 and A.2 tell us that changes in risk preferences and altruism can systematically
impact on subjects’ tendency to cooperate in a TD with underlying uncertainty. Since we observe that
individuals cooperate more in the loss domain, the propositions imply that the treatment effect could
be accounted for by higher levels of risk lovingness or altruism in the loss domain. Of course, a higher
propensity to make mistakes, as reflected in a higher p, or larger mistakes, as reflected in a larger
m, would also lead to more frequent deviations from Nash.24 In this stylized example, player 2 does
not react strategically to player 1’s actions. The next section demonstrates that the simple intuitions
developed here have bite when we allow for a larger set of strategic types.
B. Estimates from a cognitive hierarchy model
The structural estimations of this section can be viewed as a comparative statics exercise that maps
the experimental data from our two treatments into implied differences in risk preferences, social pref-
erences and sophistication. Results indicate that an explanation based on less sophistication in the loss
domain alone does a bad job at explaining the treatment effect, but they do not allow us to distinguish
between explanations that feature either reference-dependent risk preferences and reference-dependent
sophistication or reference-dependent social preferences and reference-dependent sophistication.
We adopt an augmented version of the cognitive hierarchy model in Camerer et al. (2004). Subjects
belong to different steps of sophistication, indexed by an integer k. Steps in the population follow a
Poisson distribution parametrized by t, both the distribution’s mean and variance. Each step k > 0
player myopically believes to be the most sophisticated player and, in particular, that the distribution
24Note that high claims are only a “mistake” if player 2 makes them. High claims by player 1 are perfectly rational.
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of other players follows a Poisson distribution parametrized by t, but right-truncated at k − 1. A step









Each step k > 0 player maximizes her expected utility U e given her beliefs specified in (B.1) and
anticipating that each step h < k behaves in a similar fashion. The model solves recursively after
specifying the behavior of step 0 players. We assume that a fraction 1−w of step 0 players randomize
over the action set, while the remaining fraction w play the highest action.25
With the exception of Goeree et al. (2002) and Goeree et al. (2003), experimental papers that make
use of models of noisy strategic interactions impose that players are risk neutral and selfish. In order
to capture risk attitudes, we adopt the more general functional form U(z1) = z
α
1 , where z1 represents a
player’s material payoff.26 Then, α < 1, α = 1 and α > 1 respectively capture risk aversion, neutrality
and lovingness. We also consider an alternative model with altruism, in which utility takes the form
U(z1; z2) = z1 + βz2, where z2 is the material payoff of the other player.
Both models have three parameters, respectively (t, w, α) and (t, w, β), and solve numerically for
any parameter values. Using maximum likelihood techniques, we determine which combination of
parameters best replicates the observed distribution of our subjects’ actions in each period. The trends
in figure 2 might be interpreted as evidence of learning as play progresses, which in the models would
translate into higher values of t and lower values of w. Conversely, there is no a priori reason to expect
α or β to change across periods. We therefore also estimate each model jointly over the five periods
under the respective restriction that α or β remain constant.
Table B.1 reports estimates of the model that allows for different risk preferences. Estimates of α
confirm the link between risk preferences on cooperation established in section A.27 For instance, in
the joint model we obtain α̂ = 0.95 in the gain treatment and α̂ = 3.25 in the loss treatment. We
use a likelihood ratio test that compares these models with a model that imposes the risk-neutrality
restriction (α = 1) to check whether estimates of α are significantly different from 1. In the loss
treatment we are able to reject risk-neutrality in favor of risk-lovingness at the 1 percent significance
level. In the gain treatment we cannot reject risk neutrality. These results are confirmed in the models
that are estimated over individual periods. Thus, the model that best matches the observed distribution
of actions is one that supposes individuals are more risk tolerant in the loss domain.
Estimates of t suggest that the average subject is also less sophisticated in the loss domain.28 But
25Arad and Rubinstein (2012) adopt a similar specification for the behavior of level 0 players in a game which bears
some similarities with the TD. Qualitative results are robust to imposing that w = 0.
26As we run all estimations using net claims, there is no need to define U(z1) piecewise for the gain and the loss
domain.
27One can show numerically that the optimal action of a step 1 player (and hence of all more sophisticated players)
is weakly increasing in α and coincides with Nash play when α is lower than some cutoff ᾱ(w), where ᾱ(w) is decreasing
in w and ᾱ(0) = 6
5
. When the likelihood attains the maximum in the α < ᾱ region, in case of multiple maximizers we
adopt the convention to select the largest α.
28Overall, values of t are a slightly smaller than typical estimates from the literature. This is due to the fact that the
action set is large, play is fairly dispersed and k > 0 players overall use only a small set of actions. Thus, the model
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Table B.1 Estimates of risk preferences in a cognitive hierarchy model
Treatment Period Restriction α t w LogL
Gain 1 None 0.95 0.31 0.20 −110.04
(0.120) (0.102) (0.090)
2 None 1.10 0.51 0.06 −99.64
(0.062) (0.155) (0.059)
3 None 1.15 0.56 0.01 −94.17
(0.034) (0.156) 0.034
4 None 1.15 0.90 0.01 −77.96
(0.034) (0.222) (0.034)
5 None 1.05 1.30 0.11 −53.94
(0.123) (0.268) (0.101)
all 5 α const 0.95 −435.75
Loss 1 None 6.00*** 0.11 0.11 −117.16
(1.720) (0.065) (0.062)
2 None 2.30*** 0.16 0.06 −118.67
(0.678) (0.082) (0.054)
3 None 4.00*** 0.26 0.06 −119.08
(0.560) (0.113) (0.053)
4 None 3.25*** 0.21 0.01 −116.87
(0.434) (0.094) (0.027)
5 None 1.50 0.16 0.06 −121.53
(0.880) (0.084) (0.039)
all 5 α const 3.25*** −609.10
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; significance levels from a likelihood-
ratio test against the restriction α = 1: * (p < 0.1), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
the likelihood ratio test on the restriction of risk neutrality implies that risk-preferences in combination
with sophistication fares better at explaining our treatment effect than an explanation based on less
sophistication in the loss domain alone. Note also that estimates of t show a clear increasing pattern
over periods in the gain treatment but less so in the loss treatment, while estimates of w tend to
decrease in both treatments.
Table B.2 presents estimates of the model that allows for altruism. Estimates confirm the prediction
of section A that more altruism in the loss domain can also explain our treatment effect. Moreover,
the log-likelihoods of the model featuring risk preferences and the model featuring altruism are very
similar, suggesting that a social-preference based explanation fits the aggregate data just as well as a
risk-based explanation.
Figure B.1 displays the distribution of subjects’ net claims in each period and treatment as well as
the distributions obtained from the two cognitive hierarchy models using the correspondent estimates
from table B.1 and B.2. It demonstrates how both models are able to replicate actual play remarkably
well. Numerical simulations provide additional evidence that the insights from the simple example of
section A still hold in the cognitive hierarchy models and, hence, likely also in practice. As an example,
attributes actions outside this set to step 0 players.
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Table B.2 Estimates of altruism in a cognitive hierarchy model
Treatment Period Restriction β t w LogL
Gain 1 None 0 0.31 0.15 −110.09
(0.020) (0.103) (0.040)
2 None 0.05 0.51 0.075 −99.59
(0.024) (0.150) 0.052)
3 None 0.05 0.61 0 −93.93
(0.007) (0.172) (0.025)
4 None 0.05 0.86 0 −77.80
(0.029) (0.233) (0.031)
5 None 0 1.31 0.10 −53.93
(0.025) (0.340) (0.063)
all 5 β const 0 −435.34
Loss 1 None 0.90*** 0.11 0.10 −117.02
(0.273) (0.061) (0.064)
2 None 0.30*** 0.15 0.025 −118.86
(0.121) (0.080) (0.030)
3 None 0.35*** 0.26 0.15 −120.00
(0.059) (0.109) (0.052)
4 None 0.40*** 0.21 0 −117.02
(0.068) (0.096) (0.011)
5 None 0.05 0.11 0 −121.60
(0.239) (0.052) (0.022)
all 5 β const 0.40*** −605.91
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; significance levels from a likelihood-
ratio test against the restriction β = 0: * (p < 0.1), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
figure B.2 illustrates how average claims increase with risk tolerance and altruism and decrease with
strategic sophistication. Figure B.3 disaggregate these effects by considering the whole distribution of
net claims, who shifts to the right or left accordingly.
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Period 1: gain treatment











Period 1: loss treatment











Period 2: gain treatment











Period 2: loss treatment











Period 3: gain treatment











Period 3: loss treatment











Period 4: gain treatment











Period 4: loss treatment











Period 5: gain treatment











Period 5: loss treatment
Figure B.1 Actual and estimated distribution from the cognitive hierarchy models
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Figure B.2 Comparative statics on average claims from the cognitive hierarchy models




































Figure B.3 Comparative statics on the distribution from the cognitive hierarchy models
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C. Additional material
Table C.1 The HL risk preferences elicitation task in the gain treatment
Row Option L Option R
1 6 with p = 1
10
; 5 with p = 9
10
10.5 with p = 1
10
; 0.5 with p = 9
10
2 6 with p = 2
10
; 5 with p = 8
10
10.5 with p = 2
10
; 0.5 with p = 8
10
3 6 with p = 3
10
; 5 with p = 7
10
10.5 with p = 3
10
; 0.5 with p = 7
10
4 6 with p = 4
10
; 5 with p = 6
10
10.5 with p = 4
10
; 0.5 with p = 6
10
5 6 with p = 5
10
; 5 with p = 5
10
10.5 with p = 5
10
; 0.5 with p = 5
10
6 6 with p = 6
10
; 5 with p = 4
10
10.5 with p = 6
10
; 0.5 with p = 4
10
7 6 with p = 7
10
; 5 with p = 3
10
10.5 with p = 7
10
; 0.5 with p = 3
10
8 6 with p = 8
10
; 5 with p = 2
10
10.5 with p = 8
10
; 0.5 with p = 2
10
9 6 with p = 9
10
; 5 with p = 1
10
10.5 with p = 9
10
; 0.5 with p = 1
10
10 6 with p = 10
10
; 5 with p = 0
10
10.5 with p = 10
10
; 0.5 with p = 0
10
Note: The task in the loss treatment is identical, except that 11 is sub-
tracted from each outcome.
Table C.2 The dictator task in the gain treatment
Choice Consequences
1 you obtain 11; the other person obtains 3
2 you obtain 10; the other person obtains 4
3 you obtain 9; the other person obtains 5
4 you obtain 8; the other person obtains 6
5 you obtain 7; the other person obtains 7
6 you obtain 6; the other person obtains 8
7 you obtain 5; the other person obtains 9
8 you obtain 4; the other person obtains 10
9 you obtain 3; the other person obtains 11
Note: The task in the loss treatment is identical except
that 11 is subtracted from each outcome.
26
Table C.3 Order effects in elicited preferences
First round Last round
Treatment Mean N Mean N Difference
HL switching point Gain 6.72 18 6.94 18 -0.22
Loss 5.62 21 6.28 21 -0.66
HL switching point (<11) Gain 6.19 16 6.44 16 -0.25
Loss 5.35 20 5.79 19 -0.44
Dictator giving Gain 3.17 18 3.11 18 0.05
Loss 3.62 21 2.81 21 0.81
Risk TD claim Gain 5.00 18 4.89 18 0.11
Loss 6.05 21 5.10 21 0.95**
Social TD claim Gain 4.81 18 4.64 18 0.16
Loss 6.00 21 4.74 21 1.26***
Note: The last column features t-tests on the difference in means between subjects
who performed the task in the first and the last round: * (p < 0.1), ** (p < 0.05),
*** (p < 0.01).
Table C.4 Self-reported explanations of play (importance on a 1 to 4 scale)
Gains Losses
Mean N Mean N Difference
Reasons to choose a high claim
• try to gain a lot 2.38 36 2.71 42 -.32*
• let the other gain a lot 2.3 36 2.16 42 .13
• reward who chooses a high claim 2.44 36 2.4 42 .03
• it is fair 2.3 36 2.4 42 -.09
Reasons to choose a low claim
• avoid the risk of being undercut 3.69 36 3.26 42 .43***
• let the other gain little 2 36 2.3 42 -.309
• punish who plays a low claim 2 36 2.42 42 -.42***
• it is rational 3.08 36 3.04 42 -.03
Note: The last column features t-tests on the difference in means between the gain and the loss treatment: *
(p < 0.1), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
Table C.5 Self-reported opinions on social norms (% of ”yes”)
Gains Losses
Mean N Mean N Difference
A plays a high claim and B a low one
• is B unfair? 25% 36 23.8% 42 1.2%
• would you incur a cost to punish B ? 41.6% 36 38.1% 42 3.5%
Note: The last column features t-tests on the difference in means between the gain and the loss treatment: *
(p < 0.1), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
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